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In developing countries, food aid undermines local agriculture
and creates dependence on imports. Many of the U.S.’s biggest
markets—from Egypt to Colombia and Nigeria—once re-
ceived large amounts of food aid. The arrival of U.S. surpluses
eﬀectively drove down local prices, undermined investment in
farming and created this dependence on imports.
—Kevin Watkins, head of research, Oxfam (The Independent,
October 18, 2003)
Food aid is a unique resource for addressing hunger and nutri-
tion problems, addressing emergency food needs, supporting
development programs, and directly feeding vulnerable
groups. The United States is continuing its eﬀorts to better
target and increase the eﬀectiveness of its food aid programs,
while continuing their fundamental humanitarian nature.
—Ann M. Veneman, U.S. secretary of agriculture (Economic
Perspectives, March 2002)
13.1 Introduction
Food aid is supposed to provide relief for the poor. Yet, by increasing the
supply of food, food aid may actually reduce prices and farmers’ incomes
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Does Food Aid Harm the Poor?
Household Evidence from Ethiopia
James Levinsohn and Margaret McMillanand ultimately discourage domestic production.1 In developing countries,
since the poor tend to be farmers and concentrated in rural areas, most
people assume that the negative impact of food aid will be felt dispropor-
tionately by the poor. However, most food aid is a by-product of policies de-
signed to aid farmers in rich countries, by disposing of surplus agricultural
commodities. Thus, far from being created to help the poor, these policies
are actually part of the overall agricultural policies of the rich countries.
Such policies have been severely criticized during the most recent round
of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, and many researchers
claim that food aid policies are responsible for keeping the poor, poor.
However, as Panagariya (2002) notes, the claim that these interventions
in agriculture in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries are hurting poor countries is not grounded in facts.
Forty-eight of the world’s sixty-three poorest countries were actually net
food importers during the period 1995–97 (Valdes and McCalla 1999); thus,
the removal of wealthy countries’ subsidies on food products would lead to
welfare losses for most of the world’s poorest countries. This still leaves
unanswered the question of what happens to the poorest members of the
poor countries. Within any country, households that are net buyers of cere-
als would be hurt by a price increase, while households that are net sellers
of cereals would see their welfare increase with cereal prices. Thus, the eﬀect
of a change in price on the poor depends on whether poor households are
net buyers or net sellers of cereals. Therefore, one way to study the impact
of these policies on the poor is to use the household as the unit of analysis.
Broadly speaking, the existing research on food aid can be divided into
two areas—research on the disincentive eﬀects of food aid and research on
the eﬃcacy with which food aid has been targeted. The work on the disin-
centive eﬀects of food aid typically uses aggregate data to estimate coun-
try-level supply-and-demand equations. These estimates are then used to
derive multipliers for determining the cumulative impact of food aid on do-
mestic production and trade via the impact of food aid on the domestic
price (see, for example, Bezuneh, Deaton, and Zuhair 2003).2 Less work
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1. Although food aid can take several diﬀerent forms, some part of all types of food aid (in-
cluding emergency relief) is sold on local markets and therefore either competes against do-
mestic production or reduces the demand for commercial imports (Abbott and Young 2003).
The idea that food aid could harm the poor was raised as a theoretical possibility by Nobel lau-
reate Theodore Schultz (1960). In the United States, the potential disincentive eﬀects of food
aid were oﬃcially recognized by the Bellmon Amendment to Public Law 4803, which sets out
the following criteria for approving a food aid program: “1. The distribution of commodities in
the recipient country will not result in a substantial disincentive or interference with domestic
production or marketing in that country; and 2. Adequate storage facilities are available in the
recipient country at the time of exportation of the commodity to prevent the spoilage or waste
of the commodity” (Amendment to Section 401(b) of U.S. Public Law 480, 1977).
2. A body of work similar to this, although using less sophisticated econometric techniques,
is reviewed by Maxwell and Singer (1970), who conclude that price disincentives can be
avoided by an appropriate mix of policy.has been done on the issue of targeting, at least in part because household
data on the receipt of food transfers are usually unavailable (Jayne et al.
2002). The work that has been done typically uses household data and asks
who is getting food aid and why. Our work is most closely related to recent
work by Jayne et al. (2002), who study the targeting of food aid in rural
Ethiopia. These authors use nationally representative rural household
data from Ethiopia collected in 1996 to study the extent to which food aid
is targeted to poor households and communities. They ﬁnd that food aid
does not tend to go to the poorest households and that there tends to be in-
ertia in the distribution of food aid.
We ask a slightly diﬀerent question: does food aid have the potential to
help the poor in Ethiopia? In other words, who are the poor, and are they
selling the items distributed by food aid programs? In theory, food aid
could still hurt the poor if it lowered prices for poor net sellers of food and
markets were suﬃciently segmented that it didn’t lower prices for poor net
buyers of food. This theoretical possibility seems practically implausible
for at least two reasons. First, according to Harrison (2002), there is a high
degree of serial and spatial correlation between producer and consumer
prices of grain.3 And second, although Jayne et al. (2002) and Dercon and
Krishnan (2003) ﬁnd evidence of imperfect targeting, they do ﬁnd that
poorer households are signiﬁcantly more likely to receive food aid. They
also ﬁnd that women, children, and the elderly are more likely to receive
food aid.
In addition, we use more recent data (1999–2000) and a sample that in-
cludes not just rural households but also urban households. Including ur-
ban households is particularly important for our study because one of the
criticisms of food aid is that it is used to feed the relatively better-oﬀ urban
residents at the expense of poor rural farmers. Finally, we obtain empirical
estimates of the likely impact of food aid on cereals prices using a standard
supply and demand framework.
We choose to focus on Ethiopia for several reasons. Ethiopia receives
more food aid than almost any other country in the world. Food aid
reached 15 percent of annual cereal production in 2003 and typically rep-
resents between 5 and 15 percent of total annual cereal production (Jayne
et al. 2002). At the same time, it is widely recognized that raising the pro-
ductivity and proﬁtability of smallholder agriculture is essential for pov-
erty reduction in Ethiopia. In 1992, the Ethiopian government launched its
poverty reduction strategy of Agricultural Development-Led Industrial-
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3. One drawback of the analyses by Harrison (2002) and others is that they are based on
prices between major wholesale centers. According to a personal communication from Eleni
Gabre-Madhin, an economist and specialist on Ethiopia then based at the International Food
Policy Research Institute, there is some evidence that markets in remote areas are not as well
integrated. In future work, we plan to test this hypothesis using HICES data on unit values
appropriately adjusted for quality.ization (ADLI). The centerpiece of this strategy has been a massive exten-
sion program aimed at diﬀusing agricultural technology, the Participatory
Demonstration and Training Extension System, dubbed PADETES. Re-
cent work by the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA; 2000, 2001) sug-
gests that the results of ADLI have been somewhat disappointing. For
most crops, average yields have remained stagnant, in spite of increased
imports of agricultural inputs. Average farm size has declined and prices
have fallen, leaving many farmers worse oﬀthan they were when ADLI be-
gan (Hamory and McMillan 2003). Although it is unlikely that food aid
alone is responsible for the failure of PADETES, it is conceivable that food
aid has contributed to the decline in prices.
Interestingly, in the June 2004 meetings of the EEA, in a presentation
titled “The Impact of Globalization: Its Promises and Perils to the Ethio-
pian Economy,” author Amdetsion GebreMichael claimed that
One major problem facing farmers has been the absence of appropriate
policy instruments to stabilize farm gate price and to safeguard the in-
come of small farmers. In the case of cereal prices, the absence of such a
policy combined with uncoordinated food aid ﬂows, has led to depressed
cereal farm gate prices—often to levels below costs of production.
GebreMichael goes on to argue that the downward pressure on cereal
prices owing in part to the uncoordinated delivery of food aid has un-
doubtedly reduced farmers’ incentives to enhance productivity and in-
crease output. The author provides no evidence for this statement but does
cite a report by a consultant to the World Bank that makes the same claim
(Harrison 2002).
We take the household as our basic unit of analysis, and we ask whether
households are net buyers or sellers of the basic foodstuﬀs typically dis-
tributed in the form of food aid. The ﬁrst-order approximation of the wel-
fare eﬀect of food aid is net production of the commodity multiplied by the
change in the price of the commodity caused by food aid (see Deaton 1989
and 1997 for a more detailed discussion). Thus, if a household buys more
wheat than it sells, we call that household a net buyer of wheat. Since food
aid is expected to depress food prices, food aid will beneﬁt net food buyers
and harm net food sellers. To determine the poverty impact of food aid, we
then classify households according to expenditure per capita on an adult
equivalency basis and ask whether the households classiﬁed as poor are net
buyers or net sellers of food.4
Finally, we obtain some rough estimates of the magnitude of the price
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4. This analysis ignores the cross-price eﬀects of a reduction in the price of wheat. A re-
duction in the price of wheat could depress the prices of other crops for which the poor are
net sellers, such as teﬀ or maize. However, an analysis not included in this version of the pa-
per suggests that the poor are net sellers of all crops (teﬀ, maize, sorghum, and barley) that
are close substitutes for wheat.change caused by food aid and hence the magnitude of the ﬁrst-order wel-
fare eﬀects of an increase in the price of food. To do this, we use supply and
demand elasticities for cereals, combined with information on total cereal
production and cereal food aid, to identify the equilibrium price and quan-
tity of cereals in the absence of food aid. Using the equilibrium price and
quantity in the absence of food aid and the observed prices and quantities,
we obtain an estimate of the aggregate welfare eﬀects of the price change
associated with eliminatingfood aid.5 In future work we hope to reﬁne this
analysis by using the household data to compute regional elasticity esti-
mates and by using regional data on food aid and food production to com-
pute welfare eﬀects by region.
Our household data come from two surveys conducted by the Central
Statistical Authority (CSA) of the Government of Ethiopia. The House-
hold Consumption and Expenditure Survey 1999–2000 is a nationally rep-
resentative survey that covers 17,332 households. The Welfare Monitoring
Survey is also nationally representative and covers 25,917 households. Our
food aid data come from Ethiopia’s Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Committee and the WFP. Our data on national cereal production come
from the CSA.
Our results indicate that (a) net buyers of wheat are poorer than net sell-
ers of wheat, (b) there are more net buyers of wheat than net sellers of
wheat at all levels of income, (c) the proportion of net sellers is increasing
in living standards, and (d) net beneﬁt ratios are higher for poorer house-
holds, indicating that poorer households beneﬁt proportionately more
from a drop in the price of wheat. In light of this evidence, it appears that
households at all levels of income beneﬁt from food aid and that—some-
what surprisingly—the beneﬁts go disproportionately to the poorest
households. Several caveats must be kept in mind, however. First, even the
nonparametric regressions are averages by income category and so could
mask underlying trends. The extent to which these averages reﬂect the true
eﬀects of price changes on poverty depend on whether these averages truly
represent the typical household, or whether there is a signiﬁcant amount
of variation among poor households even at the poorest income levels. Sec-
ond, it is important to note that we do not attempt to quantify the possible
dynamic eﬀect of higher food prices. It is possible that higher food prices,
by increasing the incentives to invest in agriculture, could eventually lead
to lower food prices.
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5. The Ethiopian government has no oﬃcial restrictions on commercial imports of wheat
or other grains. However, Ethiopia imports virtually no grains on a commercial basis. In
1999, commercial imports of wheat amounted to only 6 percent of all wheat imports; these
were imported by four large food processing companies based in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia does
not import wheat or any other grain on a commercial basis because transport costs are pro-
hibitive. Thus, “dumping” of food aid will depress market prices. This hypothesis has been
tested and conﬁrmed in a recent review of grain marketing in Ethiopia (Harrison 2002).In interpreting our results, it is also important to note that we are con-
sidering only the eﬀects of food aid that is imported into the country and
not food aid that is purchased from local farmers and redistributed. An in-
creasing amount of food aid is purchased locally. However, most donors do
not purchase any food aid locally but rather purchase the food from their
own farmers for distribution in Ethiopia. It may be that local purchase is a
preferable alternative for Ethiopians; however, at least so far, it has not
been deemed a politically feasible option for the majority of the donating
countries.
Recently, the United States has been heavily criticized for refusing to
purchase food aid locally. However, it is important to note that importing
food aid appears to be a widespread practice not limited to the United
States. In 1999, for example, 663,000 tonnes (t) of wheat food aid were im-
ported into Ethiopia, while only 30,000 t of wheat food aid were purchased
locally. Of the 663,000 t that were imported, only 21 percent came directly
from the United States; 31 percent came from the WFP, and 32 percent
from the European Community. In 2000, the numbers look similar:
1,074,000 t of wheat food aid were imported, and only 59,000 t were pur-
chased locally.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 13.2 de-
scribes our methodology. Section 13.3 describes our data and presents de-
scriptive statistics. Section 13.4 presents our results. Section 13.5 considers
the impact of food aid on cereal prices, and section 13.6 synthesizes our
conclusions.
13.2 Methodology
The approach we use follows Deaton (1989) and considers the impact of
changes in cereal prices on the distribution of income. In general, house-
holds that are net sellers of cereals will gain from higher prices, while net
buyers will lose. Changes in these prices will aﬀect the distribution of real
income between urban and rural areas as well as the distribution within
sectors, depending on the relationship between living standards and the
net consumption and production of cereals.
Many rural households are both producers and consumers of these
products, and the empirical strategy takes this into account. Following
Deaton (1989), we model the eﬀects of price changes using an indirect util-
ity function in which the household’s utility is written as a function of its
income and prices. These eﬀects can be summarized in the following way:
(1)  ∑
h
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6. See table 13.3 for details and sources.where W is the social welfare function,   captures the social marginal util-
ity of money, h is household, x is the household’s total consumption, z is
household characteristics, y is household production of the food crop, and
c is household consumption of the food crop. The general approach is to
calculate net beneﬁt ratios for each household and to examine the distri-
bution of these ratios in relation to living standards and region.7 As noted
by Deaton, higher food prices are likely to redistribute real income from
the urban to rural sectors. What is less obvious is how price changes redis-
tribute real income between the rich and poor within the rural sector.
Note that these are only the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of price changes and ig-
nore both the partial equilibrium eﬀects of food price changes on quanti-
ties demanded and supplied as well as the general equilibrium eﬀects on
employment patterns, wages, the price of other factors, and technological
innovation.
Our approach is best thought of as a good approximation to what would
happen in the short run (see Panagariya 2002; Barrett 1998). We focus on
these short-run changes for several reasons. First and most important, us-
ing short-run changes seems to be most appropriate for studying the im-
pact of price changes on the poor, who, as Barrett and Dorosh (1996) say,
are “likely to be teetering on the brink of survival” and less able to take ad-
vantage of supply-side eﬀects of price changes. We are also limited by our
data. To the extent that food aid drives prices down, food aid may act as a
disincentive to food production over the long run. We do not have time se-
ries data and so are unable to directly test this hypothesis. However, for all
ﬁve cereals produced in Ethiopia, there is an upward trend in production
over the period 1980–2000 (Hamory and McMillan 2003).
As we mentioned earlier, it is important to disaggregate the analysis. Al-
though the agricultural sector might beneﬁt as a whole from higher food
prices, aggregation could disguise a highly concentrated intrasectoral dis-
tribution of the beneﬁts and costs of food price changes. Following stan-
dard procedure, we use per capita consumption as a conditioning variable.
In future work, we intend to condition on land holdings and per capita in-
come.
Our approach is to study the way in which the net beneﬁt ratio varies ac-
cording to living standards. The ratio is unitless and measures the elastic-
ity of real income with respect to a price change. The manner in which the
net beneﬁt ratio varies across the income distribution tells us something
about how the price change aﬀects households across the distribution of
income. For this reason, we estimate the net beneﬁt ratio relative to mea-
sures of per capita expenditure or the conditional expectation of the net
beneﬁt ratio given a household’s expenditure.
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7. For a complete discussion of this type of analysis and its limitations, see Deaton (1997).Note that we could simply run a linear regression with the net beneﬁt ra-
tio as the dependent variable and per capita expenditure as the explanatory
variable. However, to avoid the problems associated with specifying a func-
tional form, we choose instead to analyze the net beneﬁt ratios using the
nonparametric techniques introduced by Deaton (1989). The advantage of
using nonparametric techniques is that they let the data do the talking.
Readers are directed elsewhere for a comprehensive treatment of the non-
parametric techniques employed here.
We also estimate density functions of the per capita expenditure (adult
equivalent) according to whether individuals are net buyers or sellers of ce-
reals. In the univariate case, the best way to conceptualize what we are do-
ing is to imagine ﬁrst creating a histogram where the heights of the bars
represent the proportion of the population falling within a given band. The
problem with the histogram is the arbitrariness of the choice of the num-
ber of bands and their width. Kernel estimates of the density function al-
low us to smooth the histogram and place conﬁdence intervals around the
distribution. In the univariate case, the kernel estimate of the density func-
tion of per capita expenditure, x, is given by
(2) fˆ(x)   ∑
n
i 1
K   ,
where n is the number of households, h is the bandwidth, and K is the ker-
nel. The kernel function K and the bandwidth h are chosen with the eﬃ-
ciency bias trade-oﬀ in mind. A larger bandwidth will generate a smoother
estimate and reduce the variance but increase the bias.
To determine whether an increase in the price of food would be regres-
sive or progressive, we use a nonparametric regression. This regression is
the conditional expectation corresponding to the joint densities computed
for expenditure and net beneﬁt ratios and hence contains no new informa-
tion. However, the regression does provide the answer to the question of by
how much the people at each level of per capita expenditure would lose
from the increase in the price of food. Since the net beneﬁt ratio expresses
the net beneﬁt as a fraction of total household expenditure, a ﬂat line
would indicate that all rural households beneﬁt proportionately, an up-
ward sloping line that richer households beneﬁt proportionately more and
a downward sloping line that poor households beneﬁt disproportionately.
The kernel regression estimator can be written as follows:
(3)   ˆ(x)  
∑
n
i 1yiK  
x  
h
xi   
∑
n
i 1K  
x  
h
xi   
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Our household data are taken from two nationally representative sur-
veys administered by Ethiopia’s CSA during the period 1999–2000, the
Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) and the Household Income, Con-
sumption, and Expenditure Survey (HICES). The WMS was introduced in
1994 with the explicit purpose of monitoring poverty in Ethiopia and is
conducted every two years. The WMS 2000 covered 25,917 households and
123,735 individuals. The HICES, also introduced in 1994, covers a subset
of the households surveyed in the WMS and collects more detailed infor-
mation on consumption and expenditure by product by household than
the WMS. One of the primary purposes of the HICES is to provide a basis
for computing national accounts statistics. The HICES covered 17,332
households in 1999–2000.
Table 13.1 describes the size and structure of the two data sets employed
to study whether households are net buyers or sellers of various crops. Both
data sets employ standard clustered samples, derived from a two-stage
sampling procedure. The ﬁrst stage of sampling selected a random sample
of small geographic units called enumeration areas (EAs), or neighbor-
hoods of around 200 (100) households in urban (rural) areas. In the second
stage, random samples of 12 to 35 households were selected from within
each EA, as described in the table. The sample frame for both of these data
sets excludes the nonsedentary populations concentrated in the regions
of Afar and Somali. For details on sample design and data collection, see
CSA (2001a, 2001b).
Ethiopia’s sedentary population is about 14 percent urban and 86 per-
cent rural (CSA 2001a). According to the CSA, the urban category in-
cludes the capitals of regions, zones, and weredas, any locality that is
within an Urban Dweller’s Association (or kebele), any locality with 2,000
or more residents, and any locality with 1,000 or more residents whose res-
idents are “primarily engaged in nonagricultural activities.” Our merged
data set includes 8,212 urban and 8,308 rural households. Ethiopia is ad-
ministratively divided into eleven regions, called killils. Certain killils cor-
respond with urban areas, such as Addis Ababa, Harari, and Dire Dawa.
The other killils contain a combination of urban and rural areas.
Our measures of total expenditure are taken from the HICES. Because
the version of the HICES that provides information on prices and quanti-
ties of crops purchased and sold is not yet available to the public, we use in-
formation from the WMS on total income and total expenditure by crop to
compute net buyer status. The WMS includes two measures each for in-
come and expenditure: for each cereal, it records the income in the past
month, income in the past six months, expenditure in the past week, and
expenditure in the past month. We use income in the past six months sup-
plemented by income in the past month times 6 when income in the past six
Does Food Aid Harm the Poor? Evidence from Ethiopia 569Table 13.1 Data structure
Welfare Monitoring Survey 2000 1999–2000 HICES








































Total 100 1,481 100 1,500
Dire Dawa Adm council
Rural 30 360
Urban 30 480
Total 60 840 60 840
Rural total 1,442 17,285 722 8,660
Urban total 542 8,643 542 8,672
Grant total 1,984 25,928 1,264 17,332
Note: SNNPR   Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region.months is missing, and expenditure in the past month times 6 supple-
mented by expenditure in the past week times 24 when expenditure in the
past month is missing to measure net expenditure. Because the WMS cov-
ers only a subset of the HICES, we end up with a sample of 16,520 house-
holds after merging the two data sets.
To obtain measures of income and expenditure that can be meaningfully
compared across households, we adjust for variations in regional prices
and household composition. First, we deﬂate nominal values of income
and expenditure by a regional price index computed by the CSA and re-
ported in the “Poverty Proﬁle of Ethiopia” (Welfare Monitoring Unit
2002). Next, it is useful to recognize that the same total household expen-
diture may feed more (fewer) members of a family with relatively more
(fewer) children (adults) and relatively more (fewer) women. Thus, we con-
vert our measure of real household expenditure to a measure of real per
capita expenditure on an adult equivalency basis using the East African
adult equivalency scale developed by Dercon.8
The WMS 2000 was conducted from January to February 2000. There-
fore, the variable for six-month income covers the main harvesting season,
which is September to December. Thus, the six-month income variable that
we use to calculate net expenditure measures income from the latter half of
the year and so includes the harvest months as well as the months imme-
diately preceding the harvest, when cereals are least plentiful. Therefore, it
is likely to be representative of annual cereal consumption. However, be-
cause the period of data collection immediately follows the harvest, the
weekly and monthly expenditure variables may overstate average cereal
consumption. However, since prices of cereals are likely to be lower during
this period, this bias is likely to be minimal.
The HICES was conducted to capture the seasonality aspect of agricul-
ture in Ethiopia. Each household was visited eight times: four times (once
a week over the period of a month) during the rainy or lean season when
stocks are low (June 11, 1999, to August 7, 1999) and then four times dur-
ing the harvest period when stocks are plentiful (January 3, 2000, to Feb-
ruary 26, 2000).9 Monthly totals for the two periods are then averaged to
obtain monthly annual average household consumption expenditure and
income.
Table 13.2 presents means of the main variables of interest. We use total
real household expenditure per adult equivalent (rexpae) as our primary
measure of household living standards. It is measured as total consump-
tion expenditure per adult equivalent per year adjusted for regional varia-
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8. Thanks are due to Julie Schaﬀner for providing the adult equivalency scale and regional
index programs for Stata. The adult equivalency scale is for East Africa and is based on a pro-
gram provided by Stefan Dercon.
9. There are two rainy seasons in Ethiopia. The main rainy season, meher, falls between












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2tions in prices. Not surprisingly, judging by this standard, urban house-
holds enjoy a higher standard of living than rural households. In addition,
there are marked variations across regions, with Addis Ababa recording
the highest rexpae, 2,232 birr (Br), and Tigray recording the lowest rexpae,
Br1,310. Using the 1999 average nominal dollar-birr exchange rate of 8.23,
these translate into US$271 and US$159, respectively. The poorest regions
in Ethiopia (Amhara; Oromia; Southern Nations, Nationalities, and
Peoples Region [SNNPR]; and Tigray) also produce the majority of the na-
tion’s cereals. However, these regions are vast, and agroecological condi-
tions—and hence poverty—vary widely within the regions. Note also that
the poorer regions tend to have larger households and that there appears
to be no systematic variation in the age of household heads.
Panels B and C of table 13.2 show the regional distribution of total real
annual income and expenditure from the various cereals and coﬀee. We in-
clude coﬀee as a point of interest since it is widely consumed in Ethiopia
and is Ethiopia’s largest source of export earnings. For each crop, three
items are reported: the mean across all households, the mean across only
households who report receiving income from that crop, and the percent of
households reporting positive income from this crop. Based on these data,
it appears that households tend to earn income from only one or two cere-
als, probably based on agroecological conditions. Looking at panel B, we
see that rural households rely much more heavily on income from cereals
than do urban households, with 21 percent of rural households reporting
positive income from teﬀ, 12 percent from wheat, 10 percent from barley,
24 percent from maize, 11 percent from sorghum, and 12 percent from
coﬀee. For urban households, these ﬁgures are 2 percent, 1 percent, 0.6
percent, 3 percent, 1 percent, and 0.8 percent respectively.
Panel C presents information on total real expenditure per household.
On average, expenditures exceed income for all crops, and a much larger
share of the population reports positive expenditures on the various crops,
with more than half reporting that they spent some money on teﬀ, for ex-
ample. There is a marked diﬀerence between urban and rural expenditures,
with a much larger percentage of the urban population (76 percent) re-
porting expenditure on the most expensive cereal, teﬀ, than the rural pop-
ulation (33 percent). The most widely consumed cereals in the rural sector
are maize (57 percent), sorghum (40 percent), teﬀ (33 percent), wheat (32
percent), and barley (22 percent). The most widely consumed cereals in the
urban sector are teﬀ (76 percent), wheat (39 percent), maize (28 percent),
sorghum (22 percent), and barley (14 percent).
Panel D presents data on budget shares for all households and then only
for those households that report spending anything on that particular
item. These ﬁgures indicate that households spend a large fraction of their
annual income on cereals, ranging from 26 percent to 12 percent for rural
households and 16 percent to 5 percent for urban households. Thus,
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in cereal prices is likely to transfer real income from urban households to
rural households. Only 12 percent of rural households in the survey re-
ceived any income from wheat, the only cereal imported in the form of food
aid, and it is these households that stand to gain from an increase in the
price of wheat.
The fact that mean expenditures on cereals exceed mean income from
cereals naturally leads to the following question: what are the other sources
of income in Ethiopia? Also using these data, Peacemaker-Arrand (2004)
reports that rural respondents predominantly describe themselves as sub-
sistence farmers, with 87 percent reporting that the household’s main
source of income is subsistence farming. Interestingly, she ﬁnds that the
most widespread source of income among these rural households is live-
stock. Only 4.1 percent of rural households support themselves with for-
mal employment, while 2.4 percent rely on “casual labor.” Moreover, the
picture is very diﬀerent in urban areas, where the majority of households
report main income source as formal employment, while an additional 10
percent rely on casual labor. Interestingly, Peacemaker-Arrand also ﬁnds
that urban residents rely more on pensions, rent, and family remittances
than rural households.
Our data on food aid come from the WFP and Ethiopia’s Disaster Pre-
paredness and Prevention Centre (DPPC). Table 13.3 presents cereal pro-
duction and cereal food aid from 1995 to 2001. Several facts are worth not-
ing. First, virtually all imported cereal food aid comes in the form of wheat.
Second, although the United States provides a substantial share of the
wheat food aid (42.5 percent in 1999), the majority of the imported wheat
comes from a variety of other donors, mostly European. This is notable
because of the Europeans’ tendency to blame these phenomena on the
United States. Third, although some food aid is purchased locally, the ma-
jority of food aid is imported, and the majority of food aid is wheat. Over
the period 1995–2001, an average of 20 percent of cereal food aid was pur-
chased locally. Locally purchased food aid consists primarily of wheat,
maize, and sorghum and accounts for a tiny fraction of the total produc-
tion of each of these commodities. By contrast, 663,000 t of wheat food aid
were imported in 1999, while only 1,114 t were produced locally. Thus,
wheat food aid accounted for more than a third of the total supply of wheat
and potentially had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the price of wheat.
13.4 Who Beneﬁts from Food Aid?
Since all imported cereal food aid is wheat, we now restrict our attention
to the impact of an increase in the price of wheat that would probably re-
sult if there were no food aid. The averages reported in table 13.2 do not tell
us anything about production and consumption patterns of wheat accord-
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in the price of wheat on the poor; thus, we need to know whether the poor
earn more or less income from wheat than rich households. We would also
like to know whether they spend more or less on wheat than rich house-
holds. In what follows, we examine the living standards of buyers and sell-
ers of wheat. We also examine who is most likely to beneﬁt in proportional
terms from a reduction in wheat prices.
Figures 13.1–13.3 show estimates of the distribution of real per-adult-
equivalent expenditure across households that are net buyers of wheat and
across households that are net sellers of wheat. Since the distribution for
the entire population is almost identical to the distribution of net buyers,
we do not overlay this density function on ﬁgures 13.1–13.3. Rather, the
densities for the entire population are presented in appendix ﬁgure 13A.1.
Figure 13.1 is the distribution for the entire population, ﬁgure 13.2 is the
distribution for the rural population, and ﬁgure 13.3 is the distribution for
the urban population. All three graphs show the estimated density func-
tions of the logarithm of household per-adult-equivalent expenditure by
whether a household is classiﬁed as a net seller or buyer of wheat. The log
transformation is chosen because the distribution of expenditure per
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Table 13.3 Cereal production and food aid (in thousands of tonnes)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Imported cereal food aid (wheat) 643 320 369 579 663 1074 574
Food aid imported from the 
United States 151 64 114 85 144 251 155
Food aid imported from Othera 492 256 255 494 493 813 419
Commercial imports 0 0 0 78 26 10 10
Locally procured cereal food aid 34 109 111 58 111 213 235
Total cereal food aid 677 429 480 637 774 1287 809
Imported as % of total 94.98 74.59 76.88 90.89 85.66 83.45 70.95
Locally procured as % of total 5.02 25.41 23.13 9.11 14.34 16.55 29.05
Total cereal production 6,740 9,379 9,473 7,197 8,013 8,310 9,209
Total wheat production 1,024 1,076 1,002 1,107 1,114 1,213 1,571
Imported wheat food aid as % of 
wheat production 62.79 29.74 36.83 52.30 59.52 88.54 36.54
Total maize production 1,673 2,539 2,532 1,929 2,417 2,526 3,139
Total teﬀ production 1,298 1,752 2,002 1,307 1,642 1,718 1,737
Total sorghum production 1,122 1,723 2,007 1,070 1,321 1,181 1,538
Source: World Food Programme (1995–2000).
Notes: Cereals include barley, maize, millet, sorghum, teﬀ, and wheat. For the years 1999–2001, all im-
ported cereals are in the form of wheat and all locally procured cereals are in the form of maize.
aIn 1999, other includes 206,000t from the World Food Programme, 166,000t from the European Com-
mission, and roughly 10,000t each from Denmark, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. In 2000, other in-
cludes: 464,799t from the World Food Programme, roughly 20,000t each from Canada, Italy, Great
Britain, the EC and DFID, 12,572t from Germany, and 6,000t from France.Fig. 13.1 Living standard of net buyers and sellers of wheat: Entire population
Fig. 13.2 Living standard of net buyers and sellers of wheat: Rural populationcapita is strongly positively skewed and taking logs introduces something
closer to symmetry.
The most striking feature of ﬁgure 13.1 is the similarity of the two dis-
tributions. The modal net seller is only slightly wealthier than the modal
net buyer: modal expenditure per capita per adult equivalent of the net
buyer is Br1,096 ($134), compared to Br1,211 ($148) for net sellers.10 Al-
though the patterns are similar, the diﬀerences are slightly more pro-
nounced once the sample is split into urban and rural households. Figure
13.2 shows that for rural households, modal expenditure per capita per
adult equivalent of the net buyer is Br1,096 ($134), compared to Br1,339
($163) for net sellers. Figure 13.3 shows that the diﬀerences are most pro-
nounced for urban households, where the modal expenditure per capita
per adult equivalent of the net buyer is Br1,212 ($148), compared to
Br2,981 ($364) for net sellers. Figures 13.2 and 13.3 conﬁrm the fact that
urban households tend to enjoy a higher standard of living and that there
is more diversity among the urban population.
Figures 13.4–13.11 show results of nonparametric regressions of buyers
and sellers of wheat by expenditure category. Each graph contains two
lines. The line that is connected by squares shows the proportion of house-
holds out of all households that report spending any money on wheat. The
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Fig. 13.3 Living standard of net buyers and sellers of wheat: Urban population
10. All dollar ﬁgures are obtained using the nominal average exchange rate of Br8.2 per U.S.
dollar in 1999.line that is connected by diamonds shows the proportion of households out
of all households that report earning any income from selling wheat. These
are the results of two separate nonparametric regressions where the de-
pendent variable takes a value of 1 if the household reports purchasing
(selling) any wheat and 0 otherwise and the explanatory variable is expen-
diture per adult equivalent divided into thirty quantiles. The bottom third
of the expenditure per adult equivalent distribution ranges between
Br1,113 ($136) and Br2,302 ($281). The middle third of the distribution
ranges between Br2,417 ($295) and Br3,718 ($453). The top third of the
distribution ranges between Br3,933 ($480) and Br10,762 ($1,312). For
each quantile, these graphs tell us the proportion of households that report
spending any money on wheat and the proportion of households that re-
port purchasing any wheat. The graphs provide more detail on the struc-
ture of our data. In ﬁgure 13.4, we report this information for the entire
country. We then present results for rural and urban populations and for
several regions separately.
Figures 13.4–13.11 all show that at all levels of income there are more
buyers than sellers of wheat. This is important because it means that at all
levels of living standards, more households will beneﬁt from food aid (a re-
duction in wheat prices) than will be hurt. This is consistent with the fact
that Ethiopia is a net importer of food. However, even though Ethiopia is
a net food importer, it is not the case that among the poor the majority of
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Fig. 13.4 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Entire country
(with ﬁtted values based on nonparametric regression)Fig. 13.5 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Rural population
(with ﬁtted values based on nonparametric regression)
Fig. 13.6 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Urban population
(with ﬁtted values based on nonparametric regression)Fig. 13.7 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Tigray (with ﬁtted
values based on nonparametric regression)
Fig. 13.8 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Amhara (with ﬁt-
ted values based on nonparametric regression)Fig. 13.9 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Entire Oromiya
(with ﬁtted values based on nonparametric regression)
Fig. 13.10 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: SNNPR (with
ﬁtted values based on nonparametric regression)households are net sellers of food. Thus, it is not the case that food imports
beneﬁt only the relatively better-oﬀ urban population.
For the population as a whole, the proportion of households that sells
wheat hovers around 10 percent until it drops sharply at the very highest
levels of income. The proportion of households that purchase wheat tends
to increase with income starting at around 25 percent and tapering oﬀ at
around 35 percent until it too falls—though less sharply—at the very high-
est levels of income.
Figure 13.5 shows that among the rural population, the proportion of
households that sell wheat is increasing in income. The proportion of
households that buy wheat is also increasing in income and goes from
around 20 percent for the poorest households to almost 40 percent for the
wealthiest households. Figure 13.6 shows that among urban households
there is no signiﬁcant relationship between living standards and the pro-
portion of buyers and sellers of wheat—except at the very highest levels of
income, where both taper oﬀ. A comparison between ﬁgures 13.5 and 13.6
yields some interesting insights. There is much more diversity among rural
households, and—at all levels of income—more rural households are en-
gaged in selling wheat than are urban households.
Figures 13.7 through 13.11 conﬁrm that the importance of wheat also
varies by region. Figure 13.7 conﬁrms the statistics in table 13.2 that sug-
gest that wheat is most important in Tigray, where more than 11 percent of
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Fig. 13.11 Buyers and sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Addis Ababa
(with ﬁtted values based on nonparametric regression)households report earning income from wheat and 49 percent of house-
holds report spending any money on wheat. Interestingly, Tigray is also the
poorest region and the region from which most of the current government
originates. The pattern of income in Tigray appears to be slightly diﬀerent
from the pattern for the rest of the country. The proportion of households
reporting income from wheat increases with income and then begins to ta-
per oﬀ after the tenth quantile, suggesting that more poorer households in
Tigray rely on wheat as a source of income than do richer households—
though the diﬀerences are not large (20 percent versus 15 percent). On the
income side, the pattern is similar, with one interesting diﬀerence: even
among the very poorest households, roughly 40 percent spend money on
wheat. This compares with between 10 and 30 percent for the remaining re-
gions and 20 percent for the country as a whole. Thus, Tigray is the region
most likely to be aﬀected by changes in wheat prices.
The next step is to combine the information on income and expenditure
of wheat and to examine net sellers of wheat by expenditure category. Net
sellers of wheat are the households that would be hurt by the reduction in
wheat prices associated with food aid. Figure 13.12 presents these results
for the entire population, while ﬁgure 13.13 presents results for the rural
population and ﬁgure 13.14for the urban population. These ﬁgures are re-
sults of a nonparametric regression where the dependent variable takes a
value of 1 if the household is a net seller and 0 otherwise and the explana-
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Fig. 13.12 Net sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Entire countryFig. 13.13 Net sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Rural population
Fig. 13.14 Net sellers of wheat by expenditure category: Urban populationtory variable is expenditure quantiles. The shape of the line in ﬁgure 13.12
is clearly driven by the households in the upper tail of the expenditure cat-
egories, so we turn immediately to ﬁgures 13.13 and 13.14, which are eas-
ier to interpret. Figure 13.13 shows that there is a positive relationship be-
tween whether a household is a net seller of wheat and living standards.
Among the rural population, contrary to popular wisdom, there are more
net sellers of wheat among the richer households, and the relationship is
close to linear. Figure 13.13 also makes it clear that roughly 85 percent of
the poorest households are net buyers of wheat. Figure 13.14 shows that
net seller status among urban households is also increasing in income for
the ﬁrst two terciles of the distribution. Among the wealthiest urban
households net sellers of wheat drop oﬀ quickly. Not surprisingly, a com-
parison of ﬁgures 13.13 and 13.14 shows that at all levels of income there
are proportionately more net sellers among the rural population.
Figures 13.15–13.17 show results of regressions of the net beneﬁt ratio
on quantiles of per-adult-equivalent expenditure.11 The net beneﬁt ratio is
deﬁned as total household expenditure on wheat per year less total house-
hold income from wheat per year divided by total household expenditure
per year. Thus, a ratio greater than zero indicates that the household is a
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Fig. 13.15 Net beneﬁt ratio by expenditure category: Entire country
11. Note that these ﬁgures exclude households that report both zero income from wheat
and zero expenditure on wheat.Fig. 13.16 Net beneﬁt ratio by expenditure category: Rural population
Fig. 13.17 Net beneﬁt ratio by expenditure category: Urban populationnet buyer of wheat and expresses the household’s deﬁcit as a fraction of to-
tal household expenditure. These ﬁgures show by how much Ethiopians at
each level of living would beneﬁt from a reduction in the price of wheat.
Since the ratio expresses the net beneﬁt as fraction of total household con-
sumption, a ﬂat line would show that all rural households beneﬁt propor-
tionately; thus, the change is neither regressive nor progressive. Our data
show that a reduction in the price of wheat would beneﬁt poor households
disproportionately and hence be progressive. This is true for the popula-
tion as a whole (ﬁgure 13.15), for the rural population (ﬁgure 13.16), and
for the urban population (ﬁgure 13.17). These ﬁgures also suggest that the
magnitude of the deﬁcit as a share of total expenditure is fairly large for the
poorest households (slightly higher than 8 percent) and close to insigniﬁ-
cant for the richest households (between 1 and 2 percent).
In summary, our analysis indicates that (a) net buyers of wheat are
poorer than net sellers of wheat, (b) there are more buyers of wheat than
sellers of wheat at all levels of income, (c) the proportion of net sellers is in-
creasing in living standards, and (d) net beneﬁt ratios are higher for poorer
households, indicating that poorer households beneﬁt proportionately
more from a drop in the price of wheat. In light of this evidence, it appears
that the average household at all levels of income beneﬁts from food aid
and that—somewhat surprisingly—the beneﬁts go disproportionately to
the poorest households. Several caveats must be kept in mind. First, even
the nonparametric regressions are averages by income category and so
could mask underlying trends. The extent to which these averages reﬂect
the true eﬀects of price changes on poverty depend on whether these aver-
ages truly represent the typical household, or whether there is a signiﬁcant
amount of variation among poor households even at the poorest income
levels. Second, we have not considered dynamic eﬀects. It is possible that
higher wheat prices could increase the incentive to invest in agriculture and
eventually lead to lower wheat prices.
We have established that food aid is likely to help the poor dispropor-
tionately. We have also established that for the poorest households the
deﬁcit is large at around 8 percent, and so the overall impact of food aid on
household welfare can have a substantial impact on the poorest house-
holds. What we still do not know is whether food aid has a signiﬁcant im-
pact on prices. We turn now to this issue.
13.5 Does Food Aid Depress Wheat Prices?
To answer this question, we use the supply-and-demand framework pre-
sented in ﬁgure 13.18. For simplicity, we assume constant-elasticity de-
mand and supply functions,
D   k0P ε and S   k1P ,
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are demand and supply elasticities, respectively. Our estimate of P is a pro-
duction weighted regional average of wheat producer prices for 1999. Our
estimate of the elasticity of supply is 0.45 and is based on Soledad Bos
(2003). Our estimate of the elasticity of demand is based on Regmi et al.
(2001), who found that low-income countries have own-price elasticities of
demand for cereals of about –.6. Using these estimates and the observed
quantities of wheat produced and consumed in Ethiopia, we are able to cal-
ibrate the model. The resulting supply and demand for wheat in Ethiopia
are given by
D   41,325P .6 and S   104P.45.
Using these estimates of the supply and demand functions, we ﬁnd that
the price of wheat would be $295 per tonne in the absence of food aid com-
pared with an average observed price of $193 per tonne in 1999. We also
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Fig. 13.18 Price eﬀects of food aid
Notes: $1.93 is the production weighted (by region) average of producer prices for wheat re-
ceived in Ethiopia in 1999 converted at the average nominal exchange rate of 8.23 birr per dol-
lar. 1,114 is total thousands of tonnes of wheat produced in Ethiopia in 1999. 1,777 is total
thousands of tonnes of wheat consumed in Ethiopia in 1999 or 1,114 plus food aid equal to
663 thousand tonnes of wheat. $2.99 is the price that would prevail in the market if food aid
wheat were not imported. It is obtained assuming constant elasticity of supply and demand
functions, an elasticity of supply of wheat equal to .45, and an elasticity of demand for wheat
equal to –.6.ﬁnd that the price increase would lead to an increase in producer surplus
of around US$125 million and a reduction in consumer surplus of around
US$159 million. Overall, the increase in the price of wheat leads to a net
welfare loss of approximately US$34 million. There were roughly 12 mil-
lion households in Ethiopia in 1999, of which 4.3 million reported spend-
ing money on wheat and 0.8 million reported earning income from wheat.
Therefore, on average, the loss in consumer surplus works out to roughly
US$37 per household per year for households that consume wheat, and the
gain in producer surplus works out to roughly US$157 per household per
year for households that sell wheat. In Ethiopia, where the poverty line is
roughly Br1,057 ($132), these eﬀects are quite large.
13.6 Conclusions
The argument against developed countries’ agricultural subsidies is
largely motivated by a desire to improve the living standards of the world’s
rural poor. Yet, for countries like Ethiopia that are net food importers, a
rise in food prices leads to a netwelfare loss. This might be acceptable if, in
the process, real income were being transferred from the relatively better-
oﬀurban population to the rural poor. However, our analysis suggests that
this is not the case. Although households at all levels of living standards
beneﬁt from a reduction in food prices, the beneﬁts are proportionately
larger for the poorest households. Rough estimates suggest that the welfare
impacts of the price changes associated with food aid are substantial.
Because of the magnitude of the average welfare eﬀects per household,
we believe that this issue warrants further attention. In particular, it will be
important in future work to conﬁrm that prices in remote areas follow the
same pattern as prices in major retail centers. To better understand where
the price eﬀects of food aid are being felt and how the magnitude of these
eﬀects varies across locations, it will also be important to compare food aid
deliveries to local production by region or wereda. A somewhat more diﬃ-
cult issue has to do with the timing of food aid deliveries. If food aid is not
delivered in a timely manner, it could aggravate the cyclicality of prices as-
sociated with the harvesting and lean seasons due to inadequate storage.
The most diﬃcult issue has to do with the disincentive eﬀects of food aid.
Again, given the magnitude of the price changes associated with food aid
and the associated per-household welfare implications, this seems like an
issue worth exploring.
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Comment Rohini Pande
Food donations or sales substantially below market price by a country with
an exportable surplus of food to a country in need are deﬁned as food aid.
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Rohini Pande is an associate professor of economics at Yale University.Supporters of this form of aid have argued that it is an eﬀective means of
reducing hunger; that, used for food for work programs, it may stimulate
development; and that by reducing the need for food imports it prevents
large cumulative deﬁcits for poor countries, and so provides a platform for
growth. Opponents argue that food aid increases the dependence of devel-
oping countries on food imports. The dumping of the surplus production
for free or nearly no cost to poorer nations means that the farmers from
such countries either cannot produce at competitive prices or lose the in-
centive to produce entirely (leading, over time, to the deterioration of the
infrastructure of production). They also argue that food aid is ineﬃcient—
it often doesn’t reach the most needy, and has high administrative costs.
Credible empirical evidence on the role of food aid in combating poverty
is, however, very limited. Levinsohn and McMillan’s study is an important
ﬁrst step. They use household-level nonparametric regressions, based on
two Ethiopian household surveys (1999–2000), to identify the relationship
between household income and the household’s selling or buying wheat (a
cereal typically distributed by food aid programs). Their main results are
as follows:
1. Net buyers of wheat are poorer than net sellers.
2. At all income levels there are more buyers of wheat than sellers. Only
12 percent of Ethiopian households sell wheat.
3. The net beneﬁt ratios are higher for poorer households, indicating that
poorer households beneﬁt proportionately more from a drop in the price
of wheat.
Levinsohn and McMillan also undertake a welfare analysis of food aid
in Ethiopia. They treat the Ethiopian wheat market as a partial equilib-
rium in a closed country, which received extra wheat via food aid. They ob-
serve the actual price (with the wheat aid), and then calculate a counter-
factual wheat price that they believe would have held, given some posited
elasticity of demand, absent food aid. Finally, they calculate the distribu-
tional eﬀect under the counterfactual price and conclude that the poor
were typically better oﬀ with the low (with food aid) price rather than the
high (without food aid) price.
Based on these ﬁndings, they conclude that Ethiopian households at all
levels of income potentially beneﬁt from food aid, and that the beneﬁts go
disproportionately to the poorest households.
Discussion
While focused on food aid, this paper is an important contribution to the
broader program evaluation literature, which examines the poverty impact
of diﬀerent public policy interventions. The paper provides valuable evi-
dence on the potential impact of food aid on households at diﬀerent points
in the income distribution. However, the exclusive focus on household ben-
Does Food Aid Harm the Poor? Evidence from Ethiopia 593eﬁt ratios at a single point in time limits the lessons to be learned regarding
the overall worth of food aid. In order to conclude whether food aid is a
beneﬁcial policy intervention one would need a more comprehensive anal-
ysis of the history of food aid in Ethiopia, and an analysis of the way that
aid is targeted. I will address these issues in turn.
History and Context
Levinsohn and McMillan consider households’ wheat trading status as
of 1999–2000 and show that food aid today can beneﬁt the poor. However,
food aid has been important in Ethiopia since the early 1980s (see ﬁgure 1
in Jayne et al. 2002). This history implies that to evaluate more eﬀectively
the worth of food aid as a public policy one must also ask whether the ob-
served short-run beneﬁcial eﬀect of food aid is a result of a history of food
aid. That is, in the long run can food aid change production patterns and
thereby worsen poverty? This is particularly important because most crit-
ics of food aid point to the long-run disincentive eﬀects of food aid for do-
mestic production.
Ideally, therefore, one would like to augment this study with an analysis
of net beneﬁt ratios along the Ethiopian income distribution pre– and
post–food aid. This would tell us whether the provision of food aid was as-
sociated with households’ changing from being net producers of wheat to
becoming net consumers of wheat. In the absence of longitudinal or re-
peated cross-sectional data that allow for such a direct assessment of the
dynamics of food production, indirect evidence could be used to examine
the dynamics of food aid.
One possibility would be to use aggregate data to examine the evolution
of annual wheat production, amount of food aid, and wheat prices between
1980 and 2000.1 Such an analysis, while unlikely to be informative about
the causal impact of food aid, can provide evidence on whether changes in
food aid provision were correlated with long-term changes in production
patterns in Ethiopia.
It may also be possible to exploit the fact that food aid programs do not
cover all crops to provide further indirect evidence on the long-term eﬀects
of food aid. It would be interesting to see whether the net beneﬁt ratios
along the income distribution look similar for another important crop that
is not covered by food aid programs. This analysis could be made more rig-
orous by undertaking a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis that exploits, in
addition to diﬀerential crop coverage by food aid, cross-regional diﬀer-
ences in food aid ﬂows.
Turning to the welfare analysis undertaken by the authors, it would have
been good to have more information on the relevance of the assumed de-
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1. Figure 1 in Jayne et al. (2002) suggests that the responsiveness of food aid to domestic
food production is relatively limited.mand and supply elasticities in the welfare analysis for Ethiopia. For, de-
spite food aid, Ethiopia remains a net importer of wheat. Hence, if Ethi-
opia is a small player in the world wheat market, then the relevant wheat
price for Ethiopia would be the world wheat price, and food aid need not
depress food prices.2
Targeting
Levinsohn and McMillan’s study examines the potential of food aid to
help the poor. However, if this analysis is to be relevant for policy design it
is important to ask who, in reality, beneﬁts from food aid programs. Two
recent papers, Jayne et al. (2002) and Clay, Molla, and Habtewold (1999),
speciﬁcally examine who received food aid in Ethiopia during 1995–96.
Both papers found evidence of imperfect targeting—the very poor are
more likely to get food aid, but so are the very rich. They also report evi-
dence of inertia in both the regional and household-level allocation of food
aid over time. That is, the best predictor of a household or region’s current
food aid recipient status is its previous recipient status. In contrast, the
food aid need of a region or household does vary over time. They therefore
hypothesize that the rigidity in food aid targeting is probably due to high
ﬁxed program costs, rigidities in the governmental process of determining
food aid allocations to local administrative units, and political income-
transfer objectives.
Per se, these ﬁndings do not aﬀect any of Levinsohn and McMillan’s
analysis. They do, however, suggest that any welfare calculation of the im-
pact of food aid should take into account the partial targeting of such
schemes.
Conclusion
If there are domestic markets for food, then an alternative to food aid is
cash transfers. Clearly, all the welfare eﬀects of cash transfers to the poor
would be positive if they led to poor consumers buying up poor farmers’
wheat. More generally, Coate (1989) shows that whether food aid is prefer-
able to cash transfers depends on whether the relief agency distributing
food aid is more eﬃcient at transferring food to the poor than traders.
Food aid began in the 1950s as a means for rich countries to dispose of
agricultural surplus. If the domestic imperatives of rich countries are such
that some fraction of aid from rich to poor countries will always take the
form of food aid, then Levinsohn and McMillan’s results are reassuring (at
least for the short run). However, if the form of aid to developing countries
can be altered and food aid replaced with other forms of aid, such as cash
transfers, then it remains unclear whether food aid is a preferred public
policy intervention in situations other than emergencies.
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